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Abstract: Efforts to tackle climate change are taking place on multiple fronts. This includes trade, an
increasingly important defining feature of the global economy. In recent years, free trade agreements
(FTAs) have become the primary mechanism of trade policy and diplomacy. This study examines
the development of climate action measures in FTAs and discusses what difference they can make
to tackling climate change. Its primary source research is based on an in-depth examination of
FTAs in force up to 2020. This paper is structured around a number of research questions forming
around three main inter-related areas of enquiry. Firstly, to what extent are these provisions in
FTAs essentially derivative of energy’s connections with climate change, and thus part of a wider
trade–climate–energy nexus? Secondly, what kinds of climate action are FTAs specifically promoting,
and how effective a potential positive impact may we expect these to have? Thirdly, are certain
climate action norms being promoted by trade partners in FTAs and if so, then who are the norm
leaders, what is motivating them, and to what extent are they extending their influence over other
trade partners? In addressing these questions, this study offers new insights and analysis regarding a
potentially important emerging trend in the trade–climate–energy nexus. Its international political
economy approach and latest empirical research also provide a further distinctive contribution
to knowledge in this inter-disciplinary area, developing new comprehensions of the relationship
between trade, climate action and energy.
Keywords: trade; climate action; clean energy; free trade agreements; energy trade policy
1. Introduction
Efforts to tackle climate change are now taking place on multiple fronts, including
trade. The connections between climate action and trade are becoming more significant in
a globalising world economy and system. Trade is a core defining feature of contemporary
globalisation and has created growing functional linkages between economic activities
across the planet through cross-border supply chains, production networks and other
transnational economic developments. Trade’s share of global GDP has steadily risen from
30 percent in the 1970s, just over 40 percent in the 1990s to approximately 60 percent by
the start of the 2020s [1]. Meanwhile, free trade agreements (FTAs) have emerged as the
primary mechanism of trade policy and diplomacy, with significant consequences for how
international trade is governed. For these reasons, climate action measures included in
FTAs have great potential significance, and inherently close links exist here with energy
policy as this study discusses.
Climate-relevant provisions within free trade agreements first began to appear in the
early 1980s. It was some considerable time, though, before really substantive measures
were included and a critical mass of trade partners engaged. From 2010, there was a
significant step change in activity, and this has further intensified in more recent years.
For a growing number of countries, FTAs have become another means through which
climate action goals can be achieved, also presenting opportunities for trade and energy
policy to work more closely together in new ways. This study examines the development
of climate action measures in FTAs and discusses what difference they can make to tackling
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climate change. Its primary source research is based on an in-depth examination of FTAs in
force [2] that contain climate-relevant provisions. This study is structured around a number
of research questions forming around three main inter-related areas of enquiry. Firstly, to
what extent are these provisions in FTAs essentially derivative of energy’s connections
with climate change, and thus part of a wider trade–climate–energy nexus? Secondly,
what kinds of climate action are FTAs specifically promoting, and how effective a potential
positive impact may we expect these to have? Thirdly, are certain climate action norms
being promoted by trade partners in FTAs and if so, then who are the norm leaders,
what is motivating them, and to what extent are they extending their influence over other
trade partners?
In addressing these questions, this study offers new insights and analysis regarding a
potentially important emerging trend in the trade–climate–energy nexus. Its international
political economy approach and latest empirical research also provide a further distinctive
contribution to knowledge in this inter-disciplinary area, developing new comprehensions
of the relationship between trade, climate action and energy. This study begins by address-
ing the first area of enquiry regarding the interconnections between these three elements.
After a section on its research methodologies, this study then moves to the second (what
kinds of climate action) and third (norms analysis) areas of enquiry before concluding with
its main arguments.
2. Trade, Climate Action and Energy
2.1. Core Discussion
Trade has been generally viewed in pure economic terms as having net positive
impacts on human welfare and prosperity through improvements in resource efficiencies,
consumer choice, innovation and other benefits. However, trade’s relationship with the en-
vironment is more complex. While trade can lead to more efficient use of natural resources,
raise income levels to thresholds where public support for environmental goals strengthens,
enable producers of environmental goods and services to expand and subsequently dis-
perse green technologies worldwide [3–6], it can also have negative environmental impacts
and exacerbate climate change. Trade-induced expansion of human economic activity
can consequently increase carbon and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, accelerate
the depletion of natural resources, threaten eco-systems and drive down environmental
standards in the pursuit of international competitiveness [7–10]. Trade’s net balance effects
on the environment will depend on the scale of trade-induced economic growth, the compo-
sition of this trade and how trade-related improvements in technology can reduce emission
levels [11,12]. This is highly relevant to FTAs given their growing importance in promoting,
regulating and governing trade flows, and role they can play in tackling climate change.
Energy is furthermore a fundamental element in the trade–climate relationship in
both causal and consequential senses. Trade-induced economic growth that has significant
ecological impacts will in most cases lead to, and depend on, higher inputs of energy. Like-
wise, trade-related changes in emission levels are derivatively linked to energy utilisation
in some form, whether regarding from the transportation of objects and materials around
the planet, export-oriented production, or other relevant activity. More broadly, trade’s
expanding share of the global economy has led to a de facto greater responsibility for
fossil fuel energy emissions globally, the primary cause of anthropogenic climate change
accounting for approximately three-quarters of all GHGs [13]. For these and other reasons
discussed below, energy is significantly intrinsic to connections between trade and climate
action, as revealed in the first studies on this subject emerging in the early 1990s. Most were
initially focused on border carbon taxes and carbon leakage issues [14–18]. The literature
has since ebbed and flowed, with works typically being either policy or technical/science
oriented in focus. These have coalesced to around six inter-related empirical domains where
energy is a derivative theme or element:
• Carbon-related measures: these have taken many forms. Carbon tariffs typically target
emissions arising from internationally transported goods, while carbon trading and
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market measures are usually based on emissions permit systems. Carbon sinks
primarily concern the emission mitigation services provided by forests and forestry
plantations, and often linked to carbon trading offset arrangements [19–26].
• Clean energy sector development: trade, energy and often industrial policy measures
focused on developing the productive (and hence trading) capacity of various decar-
bonising, zero- or low-emission technologies such as renewable energy and energy
efficiency, these also being core climate-relevant products targeted for trade promotion
and liberalisation [27–30] as noted below.
• Promotion and liberalisation of trade in climate-relevant products: with the aim of directly
expanding trade in goods and services that address climate change, including the
removal of barriers such as import duties [31–35]. This domain is hence closely linked
with the above domain and can extend to trade-related foreign direct investment (FDI)
issues also.
• Environmental and technical standards: that facilitate rather than hinder trade in climate-
relevant products, such as common or mutually compatible standards implemented
by trade partners or agreeing to comply with each other’s standards where these
differ [36–38]. Emission standards relating to the energy used in internationally traded
vehicles are a common example.
• Trade Transportation: mainly concerning emissions generated from cross-border move-
ments of traded products by fossil fuel energy used in shipping, aviation, road and
rail [8,39–43].
• Trade and climate governance regimes, and their interaction: as climate change is essentially
viewed as a global-level issue and trade has become increasingly globalised, this
domain has centred on the respective roles of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
and World United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which along with other international institutions such as the International Energy
Agency (IEA) began to address trade-climate issues from the early 1990s [32,44–47].
From the above, it is clear that energy is integral to all six empirical domains, these
in turn providing an important frame for this study’s analysis and discussion. Key issues
relating to energy trade should too be considered. In terms of physical flows and volumes,
fossil fuel commodities (oil, coal, gas) have hitherto accounted for the vast majority of
energy trade [48]. Yet, governance of this trade remains extremely patchy [27,49–51]. The
WTO has no specific rules on energy, it being covered instead by generically applied
trade disciplines, the most relevant being its Article XI regulations on the prohibited
use of export restrictions. National governments have generally eschewed multilateral
trade agreements in this area due to the strategic imperatives of securing their country’s
supply lines of foreign imported energy, normally achieved through bilateral contracts
with supplier countries [52,53]. Explicit energy security provisions in FTAs themselves
focused on trade in fossil fuels have remained very rare. Among these examples are
Japan’s free trade agreements with most oil-producing members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Brunei (2007), Indonesia (2007), and Vietnam (2009)—
that mainly forbade the imposition of energy trade restrictions. Some regional agreements
have meanwhile included measures on cross-border electricity trade (e.g., ASEAN Power
Grid initiative) and oil/gas pipeline transit arrangements (e.g., Energy Charter Treaty).
Both the climate action agenda and fast expansion of FTAs over recent years have,
though, provided an opportunity for trade partners to innovate with new forms of energy
trade policy, centred in particular on the clean energy sector. This has also correspondingly
led to increased attention on (clean) energy technology trade, thus moving beyond the
past almost singular preoccupation with energy commodity trade. These important new
developments in energy trade policy and diplomacy are closely linked to the rise of
climate-relevant provisions in FTAs. Moreover, the inclusion of clean energy trade co-
operation measures in these agreements—a key feature of these provisions—potentially
helps establish greater stability and order in a sector where numerous trade conflicts
between countries have arisen in recent years [30,54].
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Free trade agreements have also become increasingly important to the trade–climate–
energy nexus for other key reasons. First, the WTO and global trade multilateralism have
seriously weakened over the last two or so decades, while FTAs have become ever more
prominent. In 1990, only 22 fully operational FTAs were in force: by 2020, there were 305,
mostly bilateral in nature. Many are comprehensive in scope and depth, and their smaller-
scale and diverse nature enables them to offer more nimble, flexible and bottom-up options
for trade policy innovation compared to the global trade deal (i.e., the Doha Round) the
WTO has abjectly failed to conclude since the early 2000s [55–57]. Every FTA creates its own
laws, regulations and other provisions that shape trade flows and other economic-related
actions between its signatory parties. Aggregated together, FTAs nominally cover approx-
imately two-thirds of current world trade [2]. The transnationalisation of trade activity
through the foreign direct investments of multinational enterprises has also deepened the
regulatory reach of FTAs into national economies. At policy and wider governance levels,
trade has been issue linked with various social and environmental challenges, providing
options for FTA engagement with the climate agenda.
The second general reason is that FTAs have stepped into the trade-climate governance
vacuum created by an inert WTO and UNFCCC in this area. Just as the WTO has no specific
rules in energy, it also still has no trade disciplines specifically on climate change or action
either [27]. Given the strengthening connections between trade and climate change, Cottier
and Payosova [58] argue that this represents a significant failure of global governance by
the WTO. Meanwhile, the UNFCCC remains surprisingly mute on trade with the exception
of a few short references in its Protocols and other documents [57,59,60]. Interaction
between the WTO trade regime and the UNFCCC climate regime has been largely confined
to information-sharing dialogues [14,61–64]. Other UN agencies and key international
organisations (e.g., International Energy Agency, G20, World Bank) have engaged with
trade-climate issues but largely limited to analytical reports, most published over a decade
ago [6,65–68]. Free trade agreements have meanwhile established new elements and
structures of trade–climate–energy policy interaction.
2.2. Assessing the Impact of FTAs
FTAs have grown in importance, so the literature has expanded to assess their impact
on trade, economies and various related issues, including climate action. According to
Breinlich [69], while they can incur short-run adjustment costs, FTAs tend to deliver more
significant longer-term trade and other economic benefits. Hannan [70] argued that impact
assessments of FTAs have tended to underestimate their trade creation effects. Yet, the
highly diverse nature of these agreements nevertheless makes it difficult to make global-
level evaluations on how effective these agreements have proved generally on creating
trade and delivering positive welfare outcomes. As Baier et al. [71] contend in their survey
of FTA studies over the last 20 years, their impacts will depend on key factors that can
vary significantly, including trade gravity relationships, scope and depth of an agreement’s
provisions, factor endowment differences, and political frictions to trade. Consequently,
the vast majority of FTA impact studies tend to focus on very specific issues or specific
sub-sets of trade partners.
Trade gravity models have become, though, a standard framework for investigating the
impact of FTAs on trade costs and flows in particular between signatory countries [72,73].
These apply the principle of gravitational forces from physics to explain trade dynamics in
the world economy. Thus, trade gravitational forces are strongest between geographically
closer national economies; and the larger a national economy’s market, the greater its trade
gravitational pull on others. By way of example, Ramaswamy et al. [74] found from their
research on Asia’s FTAs that the higher transportation costs involved of trading goods
over significant geographic distances in the region are not always adequately offset by
transaction cost reductions arising from FTAs, especially when distant and relatively small
market trade partners are involved. Thus, geography and markets matter in determining
an FTA’s impact. In other recent research, Yao et al., 2021 [75], concur with the view that
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FTAs have generally positive trade creation effects but this will be significantly determined
by trade gravity factors. They also argued FTAs that especially liberalise and promote
trade in intermediate goods (e.g., parts and components) and contain less restrictive rules
of origin are particularly effective as they are more aligned to international supply chain
arrangements, this accounting for a growing share of global trade. This is particularly
relevant to multi-component clean energy goods as we later discuss.
Another key issue to note is that non-tariff measures (NTMs) have become more
important than tariff liberalisation in a growing number of FTAs—especially more ad-
vanced ones—and this has implications for assessing the impact of these agreements [76].
The scope of NTMs is broad, covering the removal of commercial policy barriers (e.g.,
competition policy) that impede trade and investment flows between FTA partners, to
trade-related co-operation measures (e.g., on clean energy) to various regulatory com-
pliance measures (e.g., on emission standards). Compared to tariff liberalisation, NTMs
can involve longer implementation processes and thus longer time to exert their impacts.
These also are frequently more qualitative in nature and therefore more difficult to accu-
rately quantify [77,78]. This issue is relevant when later discussing the impact of climate
co-operation in FTAs.
2.3. Previous Studies on Climate Action through FTAs
Although, as mentioned previously, scholarly interest in the trade–climate relationship
began to emerge in the 1990s, it was not until the early 2010s that works specifically on
climate measures or provisions in FTAs were first published [31,32,55]. By the middle
of the decade, this became particularly focused on ‘mega-regional’ FTA projects, namely
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP—EU and US), the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP—US and Japan) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(RCEP—China and Japan). Each possessed enormous potential for trade-climate regime
advancement and innovation, albeit there too being scope for trade regulatory competitive
tension between them [37,79–81]. As it transpired, the TTIP project faltered and both
the TPP (reformulated into the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP) after President Donald Trump pulled the US out of the TPP) and the RCEP contain
relatively limited climate-relevant provisions.
Global-level research published in the collaborative works of Morin et al. [34,82]
Morin and Jinnah [56] and Jinnah and Morin [83] have offered arguably the most important
studies on climate action related measures in FTAs thus far. These are all derived from
research data compiled in the Trade and Environment (TREND) database that comprises
308 environmental provision types outlined in a detailed codebook. Three key features
of the TREND database should be kept in mind: (i) its dataset runs up to 2016; (ii) it
contains environmental provisions generally; (iii) it examines all types of trade agreement (688
in number), well over half of these being weaker, sub-FTA (e.g., partial scope) agreements
with many also now defunct. In separate and more specific works, both Morin et al. [82]
and Morin and Jinnah [56] identified eight provision types from the TREND codebook they
considered were directly climate relevant. This research conducted some years ago revealed
many useful insights. This study’s research provides fresh insights and perspectives based
around its key research questions and presents new findings and arguments on climate
action through FTAs.
3. Methodology
This study’s primary source research is based on an in-depth examination of the
official treaty texts of free trade agreements. This involved a comprehensive scrutiny of the
complete documented texts of all the 305 in-force FTAs notified at the WTO by the end of
2020. Almost all FTAs are organised into chapter sections, each comprising a number of
‘articles’ which themselves consist of specific provisions (or measures) entailing particular
rules or actions that require signatory parties to comply with or commit to. Annexes, side
letters and other appendages may too be incorporated into these agreements and contain
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additional provisions. This study used a template analysis methodological approach to
scrutinise these documented FTA texts, generating research findings and results. Tem-
plate analysis involves structuring and organising the evaluation of text data through the
creation of hierarchical tier nodes that form ‘templates’ for analysis [84–86]. In the first
methodological phase, key word searches (including ‘carbon’, ‘climate’, ‘energy’, ‘emis-
sions’, ‘environmental’, ‘clean’, ‘green’, ‘ecological’, ‘renewable’, ‘GHG’, and ‘UNFCCC’)
derived from relevant terms of reference from the six trade-climate empirical domains were
conducted across all agreements to establish which FTA provisions were qualifiable as cli-
mate relevant, this meaning designed to contribute positively to climate change mitigation
or adaptation outcomes.
These provisions were then classified into different provision types utilising an
adapted form of the aforementioned TREND codebook structure. In this sense, this study
drew upon an existing coded template but significantly extended and further developed
it. Whereas previous research identified eight TREND-based provision types as directly
climate relevant, this study argues that 14 climate-relevant provision types can be classified,
as detailed in Table 1. These formed the first-tier nodes of this study’s coding template
in the initial stage of thematically analysing the text content of FTA documents. The el-
igibility of four provision ‘nodes’ (types 1, 2, 3 and 11) is based on the earlier discussed
reasoning that energy and its related carbon and other GHG emissions are the principal
cause of climate change. The TREND codebook itself combines energy with climate change
under its heading structure (Section 10.15), and half of this study’s 14 provision types
(4 to 10) come under this specific heading category. Table 1 also maps the trade-climate
empirical domains against each of the provision types, helping further establish energy’s
connections with them. Provision types 1, 2 and 3 have been adapted from the TREND
codebook to become more climate action focused from their original generic environmental
phrasing. Type 3 (‘promotion’) also includes trade and/or FDI liberalisation by inference.
Type 10 (‘other climate norms’) is a residual provisional type that rarely arises in FTAs
but is nevertheless relevant. The TREND codebook did not include the UNFCCC 2015
Paris Climate Agreement but has been added here (type 14). Table 2 details the pattern
of the 14 climate-relevant provisions across the 69 FTAs found to possess at least one
such provision.
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7 Climate change adaptation Same designation(10.15.02.02) Multiple domains
China–Costa Rica
(2010)
8 Co-operation on climatechange
Same designation
(10.15.02.03) Multiple domains EU–Hungary (1991)
9 Harmonization of legislationsrelated to climate change
Same designation
(10.15.02.04)
Trade and climate regimes,
and their interaction EU–Ukraine (2014)
10 Other norms on climatechange
Same designation
(10.15.02.05) Multiple domains Japan–Brunei (2007)



























Trade and climate regimes,
and their interaction Japan–Mexico (2004)
14 Implementation or referencesgenerally of the Paris Climate
Same designation
(14.02.20 14.04.26)
Trade and climate regimes,
and their interaction Chile–Argentina (2017)
Table 2. FTAs with Climate-Relevant Provisions.










































































































































































































































































































































































































1983 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
2 African EconomicCommunity (AEC) 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
3 EU–Hungary FTA 1991 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
4 EU–Poland FTA 1991 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2





1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
7 EU–Bulgaria FTA 1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
8 EU–Romania FTA 1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
9 EU–Slovakia FTA 1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
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Table 2. Cont.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
13 EU–South Africa FTA 1999 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
14 East African Community(EAC) 1999 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
15 EU–Chile FTA 2002 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2





2004 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
18 Japan–Mexico FTA 2004 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
19 Taiwan–Guatemala FTA 2005 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
20 Taiwan–Nicaragua FTA 2006 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
21 Taiwan–ElSalvador–Honduras FTA 2007 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
22 Japan–Brunei FTA 2007 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5
23 Japan–Indonesia FTA 2007 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
24 US–Korea FTA 2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
25 US–Panama FTA 2007 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
26 Canada–Peru FTA 2008 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
27 EU–CARIFORUM EPA 2008 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
28 China–Singapore FTA 2008 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
29 Chile–Turkey FTA 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
30 China–Peru FTA 2009 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
31 India–Korea FTA 2009 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
32 Japan–Switzerland FTA 2009 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4
33 Chile–Malaysia FTA 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
34 China–Costa Rica FTA 2010 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
35 EU–Korea FTA 2010 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 9
36 Chile–Vietnam FTA 2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
37 EFTA–Hong Kong FTA 2011 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
38 EFTA–Montenegro FTA 2011 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1





2012 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 8
41 EU–Colombia–Peru FTA 2012 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 8
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Table 2. Cont.






































































































































































































































































































































































































42 Korea–Turkey FTA 2012 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 8
43 Canada–Honduras FTA 2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
44 Chile–Thailand FTA 2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
45 Korea–Colombia FTA 2013 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
46 Colombia–Panama FTA 2013 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
47 New Zealand–Taiwan FTA 2013 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
48 EFTA–Bosnia andHerzogovina FTA 2013 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
49 EFTA–Central AmericaFTA 2013 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
50 EU–Ukraine FTA 2014 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 10
51 EU–Moldova FTA 2014 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 10
52 EU–Georgia FTA 2014 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 11
53 China–Korea FTA 2014 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
54 Australia–Korea FTA 2014 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 8
55 Malaysia–Turkey FTA 2014 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
56 Korea–New Zealand FTA 2015 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 8
57 EFTA–Philippines FTA 2016 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
58 EU–East AfricaCommunity (EAC) EPA 2016 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
59 EFTA–Georgia FTA 2016 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
60 Chile–Argentina FTA 2017 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 7
61 EU–Canada FTA (CETA) 2017 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
62 EU–Armenia FTA 2018 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 12





2018 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4
65 EU–Japan FTA 2018 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 9
66 EU–Singapore FTA 2018 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
67 Australia–Peru FTA 2018 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
68 EU–Vietnam FTA 2019 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 9
69 Chile–Indonesia FTA 2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
TOTAL 3 9 30 41 36 27 16 33 4 8 9 13 11 5 245
Separate files for each agreement were then created and the text of all climate-relevant
provisions inputted electronically into these from which this study’s text database was
created. The next stage of the template analysis process involved establishing second-tier
and third-tier nodes from a deeper level scrutiny of the text using software-based word
coding techniques. This primarily involved examining the qualitative similarities and
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differences in the text within and across provision type categories (i.e., first-tier nodes)
found in relevant FTAs, identifying further emerging sub-themes and connections based on
revealed evident patterns and correlations from interrogation of the FTA text database. This
also included determining the functional, operational and other attributes of the provisions
to ascertain their main purpose and intended outcomes.
4. What Kinds of Climate Action through FTAs, and What Likely Impacts?
4.1. What Kinds of Climate Action Are FTAs Specifically Promoting?
We turn now to this study’s second set of questions concerning what kinds of climate
action are FTAs specifically promoting, and how effective a potential positive impact may
we expect these to have. The 14 provision types provide a first-tier node classification
framework for examining what kinds of climate action measures FTAs have incorporated
into their texts. Table 2 shows the general patterns of occurrence for each provision type,
where it is clearly apparent the most important empirical domain of activity is clean energy
sector development. Of the 245 provisions from across all 69 total FTAs in this study, 146 or
60% fell into this category (types 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11). The promotion of renewable energy
and energy efficiency accounted for over half of these (77 provisions, 31% of the total)
and played an early pivotal role during the 1980s and 1990s FTAs though from quite
different perspectives.
In most of the African regional FTAs of this period (see Table 2), the promotion
of renewable energy was set in an explicit energy security rather than an environmental
context. For example, both the 1983 Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS) and the 1991 African Economic Community (AEC) agreements state in mirrored
provisions that its members will “Promote the development of new and renewable energy
in the framework of the policy of diversification of sources of energy” (Article 54.2c
of both agreements), and moreover were in both FTAs preceded in their own parallel
commitment to “Establish appropriate co-operation mechanisms with a view to ensuring a
regular supply of hydrocarbons” (Article 54.2b of both agreements), thus simultaneously
promoting fossil fuel sector development for apparently similar motives and thus leading
to particular ‘green paradox’ outcomes [10]. The 1993 Common Market for Eastern and
Southern Africa (COMESA), 1993 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
and 1999 East African Community (EAC) agreements also contained similar energy security
focused measures on renewables, hence being of tangential climate relevance at best. This
second-tier node ‘energy security’ classification of climate-relevant provisions does not,
however, extend beyond this group of four African regional FTAs.
In the 1990s, the European Union (EU) negotiated FTAs with Central and East Euro-
pean countries where energy co-operation was promoted in a broad multi-sector context
guided by sustainable development principles. The most common climate-relevant theme
across these EU-centred agreements was the promotion of energy efficiency. This was aimed
at redressing the past neglect of East European communist governments in this sector and
mitigate significant levels of transboundary pollution affecting EU member states [87].
These provisions were, however, set within a relatively weak textual framing. For example,
in both the EU’s 1991 signed FTAs with Hungary and Poland under ‘Energy Co-operation’
(Articles 77.1 and 78.1, respectively), it simply states: “Cooperation shall take place within
the framework of the principles of the market economy and develop against a background
of progressive integration of the energy markets in Europe”, and then details in the fol-
lowing sub-article a list of a dozen or so energy-related themes including “the promotion
of energy saving and energy efficiency”. Similarly, under ‘Environmental Co-operation’
(Articles 79 and 80, respectively), both agreements state that: “The Parties shall develop
and strengthen their co-operation in the vital task of combating the deterioration of the
environment, which they have judged to be a priority. Co-operation will centre on”, fol-
lowed again by a list of specific activity areas including “efficient energy production and
consumption”. While there was a regional dimension to the promotion of energy efficiency
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in these EU-centred FTAs, it lacked a substantive basis on which to develop a second-tier
node theme.
The first climate-relevant provisions found in FTAs negotiated by the United States
in the 2000s had only tenuous climate action links. For example, the 2003 US–Chile FTA’s
commitment to “increased use of cleaner fuels” (Article 19.3h) and both the US–Central
America–Dominican Republic FTA (2004) and US–Panama FTA (2007) mirrored provi-
sions on the “maintenance of clean production technologies” (Articles 17.9 and 17.10,
respectively), while the 2007 US–Korea FTA only measures related to vehicle fuel emis-
sion standards (Annex 9.B). Almost all other FTAs in study during this decade contained
only one or two climate-relevant provisions that collectively were scattered across vari-
ous provision type categories (Table 2). By this time, climate-relevant provision sections
in FTAs typically contained between only 100 and 200 words, indicative of the thin tex-
tual substance of climate action measures in FTAs that persisted for some considerable
time [88]. A possible explanation was that climate action had not sufficiently penetrated
trade discourses, norms or narratives by the end of the 2000s [44].
Even at this stage of relatively weak climate action measures, however, a template
analysis of FTA texts reveals an important general second-tier node, namely co-operation as
the main operational framework of climate action measures in FTAs. This is significant in
that only one provision type (type 8) has an explicit co-operation theme, yet operationally
co-operation is relevant to most other provision types also. It is furthermore clearly the
dominant such framework over the other evident second-tier node of liberalisation. ‘Co-
operation’ in the FTA context refers broadly to mutual commitments by all signatory
governments and other relevant parties to engage in new joint collaborative ongoing
ventures, projects or other actions in ongoing processes with the aim of realising specific
benefits and transformative outcomes. It is a dynamic and relational process that depends
on dialogue frameworks to sustain and develop the co-operative activities concerned.
Liberalisation is an intrinsic essence of an FTA, primarily focused on the one-off or phased
removal of identified technical policy measures impeding trade, foreign investment, finance
and other forms of international economic exchange. Thus, whereas in operational terms
at least co-operation is primarily about the creation of something new, liberalisation is
essentially about the elimination of existing barriers. There are circumstances, however,
where liberalisation entails some form of ongoing trade partner co-operation as discussed
later. Table 3 shows that co-operation was the focus of 84.6% of all climate-relevant
provision wording in the 62 out of the total 69 agreements with pertinent content.
Table 3. Climate Action Co-Operation in FTAs.
No. Free Trade Agreement YearSign Thematic Heading
LEVEL FEATURES
Words




























































1983 Energy and NaturalResources 1 95 100.0
2 African EconomicCommunity (AEC) 1991
Industry, S&T, Energy,
Environment 1 118 100.0
3 EU–Hungary FTA 1991 Economic (Energy,Environment) 1 260 100.0
4 EU–Poland FTA 1991 Economic (Energy,Environment) 1 245 100.0





1992 _ _ _
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7 EU–Bulgaria FTA 1993 Economic (Energy,Environment) 1 210 100.0
8 EU–Romania FTA 1993 Economic (Energy,Environment) 1 1 112 100.0





1993 Energy, Environment 1 1 337 100.0
11
Economic Community
of West African States
(ECOWAS)






1994 Environmental Protection 1 103 100.0
13 EU–South Africa FTA 1999 Economic (Energy),Environment 1 1 396 100.0





15 EU–Chile FTA 2002 Economic (Energy) 1 1 127 100.0





2004 Environment 1 1 162 100.0
18 Japan–Mexico FTA 2004 Environment 1 1 1 124 100.0
19 Taiwan–GuatemalaFTA 2005 Energy 1 1 123 100.0





2007 Energy 1 1 106 100.0
22 Japan–Brunei FTA 2007 Energy (Environment) 1 1 1 199 42.2
23 Japan–Indonesia FTA 2007 Energy and MineralResources 1 1 1 147 19.7
24 US–Korea FTA 2007 _ _ _
25 US–Panama FTA 2007 Environmental 1 1 59 100.0
26 Canada–Peru FTA 2008 _ _ _
27 EU–CARIFORUM EPA 2008 Eco-Innovation 1 1 1 159 80.3
28 China–Singapore FTA 2008 Economic 1 52 100.0
29 Chile–Turkey FTA 2009 Environment 1 97 100.0
30 China–Peru FTA 2009 Forestry andEnvironmental Protection 1 1 1 226 100.0
31 India–Korea FTA 2009 Energy 1 206 68.9
32 Japan–Switzerland FTA 2009 _ _ _
33 Chile–Malaysia FTA 2010 Environment 1 1 385 100.0
34 China–Costa Rica FTA 2010 Agriculture 1 170 100.0
35 EU–Korea FTA 2010 Trade and SustainableDevelopment (SD) 1 1 1 1429 82.3
36 Chile–Vietnam FTA 2011 Co-operation in general 1 19 100.0
37 EFTA–Hong Kong FTA 2011 Trade and Environment 1 28 27.3
38 EFTA–Montenegro FTA 2011 Trade and SD 1 132 100.0
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2012 Environment, Trade andSD, Energy 1 1 1 1 506 73.7
41 EU–Colombia–PeruFTA 2012
Trade and SD (Climate
Change) 1 1 1 463 90.7
42 Korea–Turkey FTA 2012 Trade and SD 1 1 93 74.2
43 Canada–Honduras FTA 2013 Environment 1 46 47.9
44 Chile–Thailand FTA 2013 Economic (Environment) 1 49 100.0
45 Korea–Colombia FTA 2013 Trade and SD (Forestry,Environment), SMEs 1 158 82.5
46 Colombia–Panama FTA 2013 Environment 1 36 100.0
47 New Zealand–TaiwanFTA 2013 _ _ _
48 EFTA–Bosnia andHerzogovina FTA 2013 _ _ _
49 EFTA–Central AmericaFTA 2013 Trade and SD (Forestry) 1 64 57.1




1 1 1 424 83.6




1 1 1 473 92.6




1 1 1 1 517 78.8




1 1 1 150 100.0




1 1 1 368 90.4
55 Malaysia–Turkey FTA 2014 Economic and Technical(Energy, Environment) 1 73 100.0




1 1 1 294 53.4
57 EFTA–Philippines FTA 2016 Trade and SD (Forestry) 1 1 76 55.1




1 1 1 226+ 100.0
59 EFTA–Georgia FTA 2016 Trade and SD (Forestry) 1 1 82 63.6
60 Chile–Argentina FTA 2017 Trade and Environment(Climate Change) 1 1 193 58.1
61 EU–Canada FTA(CETA) 2017 Trade and Environment 1 1 275 77.5
62 EU–Armenia FTA 2018 Climate Change, Tradeand SD, Energy, Industry 1 1 1 1 976 81.5
63 US–Mexico–CanadaAgreement (USMCA) 2018
Environment (Maritime,










1 1 191 60.1
Energies 2021, 14, 4363 14 of 30
Table 3. Cont.
No. Free Trade Agreement YearSign Thematic Heading
LEVEL FEATURES
Words
























































65 EU–Japan FTA 2018 Trade and SD, Regulatory 1 1 1 251 63.5
66 EU–Singapore FTA 2018 Renewable Energy, Tradeand SD 1 1 1 1228 86.7
67 Australia–Peru FTA 2018 Environment 1 1 54 42.2
68 EU–Vietnam FTA 2019 Trade and SD (ClimateChange) 1 1 1 1368 94.4
69 Chile–Indonesia FTA 2020 Environment 1 37 100.0
8 18 29 7 15 23 24 249 ave 84.6% ave
Notes: FTAs not in bold text indicate no co-operation provisions. Thematic headings in brackets indicate they were specific sub-headings
under the broader theme noted before it or them.
The emphasis on co-operation over liberalisation was investigated deeper in this
study’s template analysis of FTA texts, from which third-tier nodes were developed to
identify both: (i) progressive levels, and (ii) key common functional features of this co-
operation. This helped determine further degrees of specificity regarding what kind of
climate action measures have been incorporated into FTAs. Key word searches were again
deployed in this process when differentiating between climate-relevant provisions here.
The first set of third-tier nodes centres on four conceptual progressive levels of co-operation:
• Optional—parties do not expressly commit to co-operation on climate action but rather
leave it optional, often using conditional language. Examples of key coded words
relevant here are ‘may’, ‘possible’, and ‘potential’.
• Intentional—explicit statements of intent to co-operate, often with climate-relevant
issues identified, but lacking detail on actions, methods and objectives. Key coded
words here included ‘shall’, ‘will’, and ‘in order to’.
• Action-Structured—specific co-operative actions are outlined in detail within an ac-
tional framework or loose governance structure but with no set targets or schedules.
Here, key coded words covered various types of action (e.g., workshops, training,
information exchange, technology transfer, joint projects, technology development,
infrastructure development) and at times involved agencies with reference to some
sort of co-operation or governance process, e.g., ‘regular dialogue’.
• Programmatic—the agreement contains a programmatic plan of specified actions, tar-
gets and schedules for co-operation in a well-defined governance structure with key
coded words (e.g., plan and strategy, with reference to numeric targets, timeframes,
and agencies) reflecting this. The governance structure aspect has links with ‘institu-
tionalised co-operation discussed later.
Table 3 shows the distribution of these levels achieved across relevant FTAs. More
impactful forms of climate action will naturally arise from the latter two co-operation
levels. By ‘governance structure’ we are referring mainly in this context to some kind
of decision-making entity or arrangement with general responsibility to overseeing the
co-operation outlined in the agreement. This is invariably non-existent in the first two
co-operation levels, often quite weak at the action-structured level and strongest at the
programmatic level. As Table 3 shows, action-structured co-operation has been constantly
dominant, arising in 29 FTAs, yet the highest-level programmatic co-operation only appears
relatively late from 2014 onwards with seven agreements out of the last 20 signed, indicating
there remains much scope to deepen levels of climate action co-operation generally within
FTAs. Regarding trade partner patterns, the EU is especially significant, being involved in
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approximately one-third of the agreements and oriented towards higher-level co-operation.
Moreover, it has recently signed agreements containing programmatic co-operation text
of approximately 1000 words or more, over four-times the trade partner average as a
secondary proxy measure of substantive co-operation. Most other active trade partners
(Korea, Japan, Chile, Peru, Canada, China, Singapore, Australia, Malaysia, EFTA, Mexico
and New Zealand) lie in the mid-level range.
A second set of third-tier nodes were identified and developed from this study’s text
analysis around three key common functional features of climate action co-operation in
FTAs, these being:
• Institutionalised—co-operation is overseen or managed by a newly established insti-
tutional body created by the FTA on its implementation. This is a higher-form of
aforementioned ‘governance structure’ in this context (e.g., a Co-operation Committee
or similar agency) either specifically charged with responsibility for climate-relevant
co-operation between signatory parties or with all trade-related co-operation outlined
in the agreement.
• Assistive—commitment of parties to co-operate on climate action capacity-building
issues (e.g., technology transfer, training) principally aimed at assisting the less devel-
oped trade partner.
• Multilateral-Supportive—pledges to co-operate in supporting wider international and
multilateral efforts on climate action.
As we would expect, there is a strong correlation between institutionalised co-operation
and the higher progressive forms of co-operation. However, not all instances of action-
structured co-operation fell into this category: likewise, climate action co-operation in FTAs
may have high-level institutionalisation but not be necessarily that ambitious. Never-
theless, FTAs with institutionalised co-operation are more likely to operationalise stated
co-operative measures due to the organisational structures created to implement, manage
and develop climate action co-operation between trade partners. Table 3 shows that this
has become a steadily more important functional feature of co-operation. Meanwhile,
assistive climate co-operation was particularly strong in the 1990s and 2000s, remaining a
regular feature in the more recent time period. This may be explained by the developed-
developing economy partnerships still being a key trend of climate-relevant FTAs. There
has also been a growing trend of multilateral-supportive co-operation commitments in FTAs,
especially from 2014 onwards. This mainly relates to support of UNFCCC global climate
action efforts and aligning trade diplomacy more closely to this end generally. From a trade
partner perspective, half the EU’s 20 relevant FTAs contain both explicitly institutionalised
co-operation and assistive co-operation features, and from 2008 all 12 of its climate-relevant
FTAs have included multilateral-supportive co-operation provisions. Japan and Korea have
both also been relatively active in this last area, and Korea’s FTAs have a comparatively
strong profile across all three features in relation to other trade partners.
Regarding the minor second-tier node of climate-relevant trade liberalisation, interest-
ingly, no FTA makes reference in their main agreement text to any specific import duty
reductions for climate-relevant products it may contain. This seems somewhat surprising
but may be partly due to long-standing product classification disagreements amongst trade
partners on deciding which goods and services qualify as having a climate action purpose.
Examples often include component parts such generic ball bearings used in wind turbines
and other engineering equipment, or drilling bits used in both geothermal energy and
hydrocarbon exploration activity. The plurilateral Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA)
trade liberalisation talks that lasted from 2011 to 2016 broke down due to such disagree-
ments (Dent 2018). Many agreements will have nevertheless included measures—such as
in their tariff and rules of origin schedules—to remove or reduce trade and investment bar-
riers on products indisputably considered climate goods and services (e.g., fully assembled
solar panels) as part of a generalised trade liberalisation process. Yet only 20 FTAs had
contained in their main treaty text any reference to climate-relevant liberalisation process
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by 2020. Within this set of agreements, a third-tier node text analysis was conducted, and
the following six kinds or types of trade and investment liberalisation were identified:
A. Address or remove non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in environmental goods and services
(EGS) trade/FDI generally—assumed to also cover climate-relevant products.
B. Address or remove NTBs in climate-relevant trade/FDI specifically—where climate-
relevant products are explicitly referred to.
C. Remove any obstacles or barriers generally to climate-relevant or EGS products
trade/FDI—broader in scope than the above.
D. Eliminate tariffs on EGS trade between the FTAs parties generally—on this particular
measure and again assumed to cover climate-relevant products.
E. Work in international fora to liberalise EGS trade globally—thus extending beyond
the trade of the FTA signatory parties.
F. Free movement of business-persons facilitating EGS trade and FDI—particularly
pertinent to climate-relevant services trade.
These types of liberalisation measures mostly embed climate-relevant products in the
broader EGS trade and investment context. Environmental goods and services include a
wide range of products, many of which are not directly linked to or explicitly associated
with climate action. Thus, such EGS references make the links here to climate action related
liberalisation provisions in FTAs often inferred or implicit. Table 4 shows that type A is
the dominant liberalisation measure, appearing in 16 (80%) of the relevant agreements.
Measure type C was a distant second occurring six times, type B just four times while type E
and type F have only been found in one agreement each. Liberalisation was also invariably
situated in the context of ‘promoting’ trade and investment in EGS/climate-relevant prod-
ucts, with links to trade facilitation measures. Type E liberalisation has an overlap with
what might also be construed as co-operative action but, as noted above, the emphasis of
climate-relevant provisions here is clearly on conventional forms of trade liberalisation.
By way of bringing key elements of this discussion together, recent EU free trade
agreements have set new benchmarks of climate action through FTAs and provide good
examples of both progressive, multi-functional co-operation as well as liberalisation in
this regard, including how these may be combined. For instance, its FTAs with Singapore
(2018) and Vietnam (2019) have identical chapters on ‘Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade and
Investment in Renewable Energy Generation’ that coalesce co-operation and liberalisation
measures together. Article 7.1 of the chapter starts by stating: “In line with global efforts to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Parties share the objective of promoting, developing
and increasing the generation of energy from renewable and sustainable non-fossil sources,
particularly through facilitating trade and investment. To this effect, the Parties shall
co-operate towards removing or reducing tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers, and shall
cooperate on fostering regulatory convergence with or towards regional and international
standards”. The aim is thus to co-operate to achieve multiple inter-linked objectives, to use
trade and foreign investment as drivers of clean energy development, to liberalise trade
and investment in clean energy products, and work together on regulatory matters, and the
technical details on all the above are outlined in subsequent articles in the chapters. Article
7.7 refers to each FTA’s new formed Trade Committee that has institutional responsibility
for implementing climate-relevant provisions, mainly focused on clean energy. Similar but
not identical chapters on Trade and Sustainable Development in each agreement further
augment and broaden trade partner climate action co-operation in wider multilateral
(i.e., UNFCCC) contexts, and working together in the international community generally
for “the promotion of energy efficiency, low-emission technology and renewable energy”
(Chapter 12 in the EU–Singapore FTA, Chapter 13 in the EU–Vietnam FTA).
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Table 4. Climate-Relevant Liberalisation in FTAs.

































































































































































































35 EU–Korea FTA 2010 1
37 EFTA–Hong Kong FTA 2011 1
38 EFTA–Montenegro FTA 2011 1
40 EU–Central America FTA 2012 1 1 1
41 EU–Colombia–Peru FTA 2012 1 1
42 Korea–Turkey FTA 2012 1
47 New Zealand–Taiwan FTA 2013 1 1 1
48 EFTA–Bosnia andHerzogovina FTA 2013 1
49 EFTA–Central America FTA 2013 1
50 EU–Ukraine FTA 2014 1
52 EU–Georgia FTA 2014 1
54 Australia–Korea FTA 2014 1
57 EFTA–Philippines FTA 2016 1
59 EFTA–Georgia FTA 2016 1
61 EU–Canada FTA (CETA) 2017 1 1
62 EU–Armenia FTA 2018 1 1






66 EU–Singapore FTA 2018 1 1
68 EU–Vietnam FTA 2019 1
TOTAL 16 4 6 1 1 1
Note: EGS—environmental goods and services.
Meanwhile, Chapter 4 of the EU–Armenia FTA (2018) on ‘Climate Action’ comprises a
wide set of measures principally designed to assist the development of Armenia’s climate
action capacity at both national and international levels. Article 54 of this chapter outlines
ten objectives of co-operation in this regard, including the development of a low-carbon
development plan, various energy policy measures and a climate action strategy. Article
52 beforehand details the promotion of measures to facilitate this assistive co-operation,
for instance technology transfers, sector-specific (e.g., clean energy) policies, education
and training. This work is overseen by the FTA’s Partnership Committee, working in a
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similar institutional way to the EU’s agreements with Singapore and Vietnam to manage
trade partner co-operation across other aspects of the agreement. In another example,
the earlier signed EU–East Africa Community FTA (2016) also contained measures with a
strong assistive co-operation dimension, including in its Annex III a programmatic set of
renewable energy development targets and plans linked to the agreement. In all these cases,
FTAs have leveraged a broad range of climate actions in trade partner countries. We later
discuss the prospects of these latest EU climate-relevant FTAs affecting other trade partner
behaviour through norm leadership and influence. In sum, this study’s template analysis
of FTA texts clearly reveals particular levels and functional features of co-operation are the
dominant observable kinds of climate action arising in FTAs, with clean energy being an
underlying focus.
4.2. How Effective a Potential Positive Impact on Climate Action?
What potential positive impacts, then, can we expect climate action measures in
FTAs to have? Low-level, non-institutionalised co-operation is likely to result in limited,
non-evaluated outcomes, or ensuing actions simply subsumed into wider co-operation
efforts between trade partners where the FTA’s additional contribution to them may be
minimal or not easily ascertained. Higher-level action-structured and programmatic co-
operation is where we may expect more positive impacts to arise, this too depending on
the effectiveness of institutionalised or other governance structure arrangements charged
with the responsibility of managing co-operation.
In their own earlier assessment of climate action measures in trade agreements gen-
erally, Morin et al. [82] and Morin and Jinnah [56] assessed their potential impact across
four themes. They assigned the most contributory significance and attention to legalisation,
concerning enforceable laws and regulations embodied in trade treaties. Given that virtu-
ally all nations have become signatories to at least one FTA, the legislative structures and
processes involved in legally implementing an agreement will vary enormously. The same
applies to the effectiveness of its implementation, this in turn depending largely on various
development-related capacities of signatory nations concerned. Generally speaking, it
could certainly be argued that legally binding commitments within an FTA to undertake
specified actions within certain timeframes are likely to have more defined and quantifiable
impacts on trade-related behaviours. Indeed, we can expect that a legalised commitment by
FTA partners to undertake climate-relevant co-operation would lead to more substantive
results. However, it will depend on how and where the legalisation approach is applied.
For instance, new rules on liberalising tariffs on climate-relevant goods may not result in
much change if companies opt not to utilise them, this often occurring due to restrictive
rules of origin regulations [89,90]. In a less passive and more proactive approach, legal
measures in FTAs that lead to significant enhancements in the signatory governments’ own
general climate action laws and policies (e.g., more ambitious carbon emission targets)
would have a more assured positive impact. Yet it may be more logical to use other types
of agreement for such broad-focused legal commitments, especially where the links to
trade are tenuous. In another example, an FTA could carry a legal commitment to zero
carbon shipping in traded goods between signatory countries but here a multilateralised
agreement (e.g., at International Maritime Organisation level) would be more practical.
Climate change itself is a global-level issue, and thus multilateral approaches to
tackling it are critically important. As we have seen, a number of bilateral and regional
FTAs contain measures (provision types 12, 13 and 14) aimed at supporting UNFCCC-
based global efforts here, often re-affirming their existing legal commitments to reduce
carbon emissions and thus negating the need for any regulatory duplication in FTAs. While
then there is scope to apply the legalisation approach across all six trade-climate empirical
domains—and this would result in more significant positive impacts—there are also many
circumstances where countries negotiating FTAs with active climate policies will view
other forms of international treaty and diplomacy more logical and effective to include
legally-binding measures., Legalisation nevertheless represents an important frontier ahead
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of climate action measures in FTAs if they are to become more impactful. The previously
studied recent EU agreements with Singapore, Vietnam, Armenia and the East Africa
Community interestingly all contain co-operative provisions aimed at facilitating climate
action legislation and regulation, presenting a possible evolutionary way forward for future
FTAs.
The other three themes noted by Morin et al. [82] and Morin and Jinnah [56] were
innovation, replication and distribution. Innovation as previously discussed relates mainly
to the introduction of new forms of climate-relevant provisions. Replication considers the
pervasiveness or presence of a climate-relevant provision in trade agreement landscape.
Distribution focuses on the profile of countries adopting them. All three themes connect
closely the next section’s discussion on emerging climate action norms in FTAs. The
potential positive impact on climate action measures in FTAs will be also determined by
trade partner factors. Approximately 90% of in force FTAs worldwide are bilateral, that is
involving two signatory sides [2]. In certain FTAs, at least one ‘signatory side’ may be a
regional group, such as the EU or EFTA, and in some cases both may be (e.g., EU–Central
America), thus in these instances involving multiple trade partners. Nevertheless, the
large majority of FTAs are purely bilateral with just two signatory countries, this also
being the case for the 69 agreements found to have climate action measures (Table 2). This
raises important questions about possible limited impact of their impacts, especially when
we also take into consideration earlier discussed trade gravity factors where the bilateral
trade partners are relatively small and geographically distant e.g., Malaysia–Turkey, Chile–
Thailand. Even if purely bilateral FTAs are aggregated together, their collective climate
action impact may be insignificant due to limited geographic and trade volume coverage,
regardless of their measures’ substance and ambition. This is less of an issue for regionally
multilateralised FTAs, involving a large set of countries and may include influential trade
powers such as the EU.
5. Climate Action Norm Leadership and Influence in FTAs
The previous section’s examination of what kinds of climate action are arising in FTAs
was primarily concerned with provisions in the agreements, using the template analysis
approach. This section builds on that work and seeks to develop a deeper understanding
of the patterns of action, who is shaping them and why. A norms analysis framework is
used for this purpose and addresses this study’s third set of research questions concerning
whether certain climate action norms are being promoted by trade partners in FTAs and if
so, then who are the norm leaders, what is motivating them, and to what extent are they
extending their influence over other trade partners?
5.1. Norms Analysis: A General Overview
Norms relate to actions, ideas or practices that become commonly adopted by ac-
tors, forming the basis of standardised or ‘normalised’ behaviour although this can arise
on multiple levels, from the highly generalised to deeper and more specific norms [91].
They are generally viewed in sociological terms, and FTAs can provide the basis for es-
tablishing norm structures that shape patterns and structures of policy practice amongst
actors. Finnemore and Sikkink [92] propose that norms can be regulative (ordering and
constraining actor behaviour) or constitutive (creating new categories of action, interests
and agency), the latter being most relevant to this study’s findings. In addition, norm leader-
ship (and relatedly, norm entrepreneurship) can play a key role in shaping a particular regime,
such as trade. This is achieved through the exercise of norm influence, which has three
progressive stages: (i) ‘emergence stage’, where norm leaders through innovative practice
and behaviour try to persuade other actors to emulate them; (ii) ‘acceptance stage’, a critical
mass of actors have adhered to a new norm of practice and becomes gradually accepted in
the wider actor community through socialisation, demonstration and institutionalisation
effects; (iii) ‘internalisation stage’, where a new norm becomes default practice amongst
the majority of conforming actors, at often codified into law and regulation within relevant
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governance structures. There are close connections with the earlier noted concepts on FTA
provision impact: innovation with norm entrepreneurship, and distribution and replication
with the above three progressive stages of norm influence.
For norm leaders to succeed, they require adequately strong organisational platforms—
such as a robust diplomacy apparatus or network—on which to innovate and promote
new norms through replication and distributive efforts. These may call attention to specific
issues such as climate change, or even frame them in a particular way conceptually or
within certain narratives, discourses or modes of language. Such ‘cognitive framing’ is
a key political strategy of norm leaders, establishing new public understandings of the
issues concerned [92,93]. Norm leadership and influence may also depend on different
forms of power capacity, whether this be for example soft power (e.g., strong projections of
socio-cultural influence), material-based power (e.g., economy or market size, economic
resources) or structural power (e.g., capability to shape international governance structures
such as the WTO trade rules regime), these all being relevant to trade relations and can
overlap with each other [44,94–96]. For instance, both soft and material-based power can
strengthen and provide leverage for exercises of structural power in establishing new
norms in multilateral or mega-regional FTAs, such as the US’s regulatory imprint on the
Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement [97]. It could be argued that more effective climate
action is likely to arise where FTAs create new norms of common good practice around
which more concerted and aligned international efforts can emerge and coalesce, these
then forming the basis of new trade-climate governance regimes. These norms may form
organically through a broad international effort, or though the actions of a singular or few
dominant trade partners.
5.2. Climate Norms Leaders and Influencers?
The different tier nodes of climate action in FTAs established in the previous section’s
template analysis may also be considered as trade-climate norms. For example, we saw how
many climate-relevant provisions found in these agreements strongly clustered around
clean energy sector development for reasons discussed earlier, and that trade-related co-
operation was the most commonly adopted or normalised framework under which climate
action is operationalised. These more generalised norms have arisen from essentially
an organic process over time rather than directed or led by any particular trade partner
or norm leadership. Furthermore, heterogeneity has in one sense has been the norm
in many aspects of climate-relevant provisions in FTAs. For example, these have been
placed under 23 different co-operative thematic headings in total (Table 3), indicative of
the multiple issue-linkage connections across the six trade-climate empirical domains.
While ‘environment co-operation’ and ‘energy co-operation’ were popular themes, this
somewhat random general pattern also reflects a frequent outcome in bilateral FTAs per
se, especially when the trade partners themselves are relatively small-to-medium sized
economies and have limited capacity or inclination to develop their own well-defined
norms of trade-related policy practice.
It has only been in the last decade, though, that climate action activity in FTAs has
markedly intensified and developed far more critical mass, from which more discernible
instances of norm leadership and influence can be observed. To help set the context for this
analysis, Figures 1 and 2 show trade partner linkages on climate-relevant FTAs, up to 2010
and 2020, respectively. The ‘bandwidth’ links between trade partners represent the range
of climate-relevant provision types covered in their agreement. A step change in activity
is clearly evident from Figure 1 to Figure 2 both in terms of linkages and trade partner
engagement. At a general level, we may expect trade partners with the most significant
provision bandwidth and larger number of agreements to be the most likely norm leaders
and influencers. The EU is at the centre of both Figures in acknowledgement of this and
has been by far the strongest climate norms leader and influencer in FTAs. The EU was one
of the earliest protagonists of climate action measures in FTAs (Table 2) and has been an
important innovator, introducing six of the 14 provision types (Table 1) and extending the
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reach of many types into new areas of trade partner co-operation. Let us first examine its
broader motivations and interests regarding trade-climate matters generally to understand
its norms behaviour, including how the EU’s position here developed institutionally.
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Europe is known for its strong socio-cultural values and policies on environment and
climate change, and relatively early on EU leaders identified climate diplomacy as an area
where Europe could establish a global leadership position [98]. The 1986 Single European
Act introduced obligations for member states to integrate environmental protection into
all EU policies, including trade [99]. The European Commission’s White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment [100], imbued with ecological modernisation thinking
(e.g., trade and green growth), further established the EU as arguably the strongest global
leader on environmental issues by this time, especially on climate change [36,101]. Later
that decade, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty acknowledged sustainable development as a core
EU objective to be pursued both internally and in Europe’s external relations, hence trade.
In 2006, the EU revised its new Sustainable Development Strategy, updating the earlier
2001 version, and called for increased efforts to use international trade to achieve global
sustainable development through the incorporation of more ambitious environmental mea-
sures in EU trade agreements [102,103]. This involves Sustainable Impact Assessments that
had been included in all EU-signed trade agreements since 2000, these being more rigorous
than their US counterparts [99,104]. These principles and goals were also incorporated
into the EU’s Global Europe—Competing in the World strategy policy document also pub-
lished in 2006, stating that new ‘competitiveness-driven’ FTAs would include provisions
on environmental co-operation with trade partners and at the global multilateral level.
The EU possesses a strong and sophisticated organisational platform on which to conduct
a common trade policy, comparable in many respects to the United States in terms of trade
power capacity. The EU’s push for global leadership on climate action can be understood
in the wider context of the EU’s norm leadership more generally on a range of global
issues, what Manners [105] refers to as ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE). This concept is
based around a set of values and norms, including on sustainability and climate action,
and how the EU projects itself and its norms on the world stage through various diffusion
mechanisms, including through a powerful trade diplomacy apparatus. Another key
source of EU trade norm influence derives from the concept of ‘Market Power Europe’,
founded on the Single European Market, the EU’s market regulatory capacities and how the
EU externalises its rules, standards and other market governance norms either explicitly or
implicitly through a range of diplomatic channels and instruments at its disposal [106–108].
There is a close overlap here with NPE, but MPE is more centred on the EU’s regulatory,
technical and material capacities. Taking these two concepts together, the EU has both
significant power capacities regarding climate norm leadership and influence in FTAs.
Bastiaens and Postnikov [36] argue that on trade-related environmental issues in its
trade diplomacy, the EU adopts a ‘soft judicial’ approach in contrast with the US’s more
assertive legal-contractual approach. For example, although EU trade agreements include
expert review panels adjudicating on non-compliance issues, there are no financial penal-
ties if panel rulings are not complied with. Instead, the EU uses its Civil Society Dialogue
process that bring together all relevant parties to resolve compliance and implementation
issues. This dialogical approach is consistent with the Normative Power Europe emphasis
on persuasion not coercion, and notably contrasts with the US’ hard legal-contractual
approach of sanctions and fines. Furthermore, the EU generally eschews the US’s ‘boiler-
plate’ approach to FTA negotiation, allowing for more flexibility and responsiveness to the
interests of its trade partners. Nevertheless, an analysis of FTA texts where the EU is a party
reveals evidence of replication where the European Union is clearly the norm influencer.
As discussed earlier, for example, it negotiated the inclusion of very similar clean energy
sector provisions in its FTAs with Central and East Europe states during the 1990s. This
created a wider regionalised distribution of climate action measures in trade agreements
across Europe, and where norm acceptance arose from the pre-accession conditions set by
the EU in alignment with its deeper institutionalisation of trade-climate policy linkages.
A similar pattern of norm influence could be observed in the EU’s multiple FTAs with
Ex-Soviet republic states in the mid-to-late 2010s: the first three (Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine signed in 2014) were simultaneously negotiated, while the fourth and last FTA
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with Armenia (2018) was based on them. At a general observational level, Table 2 shows
a strikingly similar and wide pattern of climate-relevant provision types across all four
agreements. More specifically, their starting Preamble sections have a verbatim common
commitment to “promoting energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources”,
with relatively greater emphasis on energy efficiency through the treaty texts (mentioned
between 7 and 10 times) thus some parallels exist here with the EU’s norm influence on
clean energy towards Central and East European nations in the 1990s. Examination of the
FTA texts reveal very similar climate action measures set within the same multiple trade-
related co-operation sectors, e.g., energy, economic, climate change, trade and sustainable
development (see Table 3). In its advocacy of climate multilateralism, the EU also negotiated
for stronger norms compliance with UNFCCC general efforts on climate change, and more
specifically with the Kyoto Protocol. All four countries were additionally compelled to
adopt within the agreements’ Annex section a very similar wide range of EU Directives
on environmental legislation, many being climate action related but not necessarily set
within an explicit trade context. The EU’s treaties with these countries were technically
‘Association Agreements’ that could be best described as FTA-plus pacts, where trade
partners are obliged to enact certain EU laws and regulations to gain the benefits of
associate EU membership. Although this substantive example of norm influence was
arguably non-trade related, these FTAs were used by the EU to normalise stronger climate
action policies and behaviour in these trade partners.
However, in both sub-sets of trade partner cases, the climate norms promoted by the
EU were both time phase and group specific, thus with limited replication effects and only
a very general pattern of norm continuity on energy efficiency measures being evident.
Aside from the degree of reflexivity in the EU approach to FTAs, reasons for the lack of
more specificity in EU norm influence could be explained by the different sets of trade
negotiators employed over this 20 year period, and how the EU’s own climate norms
themselves will have evolved in light of new ideas and events, e.g., UNFCCC climate
diplomacy. While the earlier discussed case of the EU’s agreements with two Southeast
Asian nations (Singapore and Vietnam) highlighted close replication of programmatic,
multi-functional co-operation and other substantive climate action measures, this was a
much smaller sub-set case and their future norm influence may be limited to its specific
sub-set parameters, i.e., other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade
partners. It was previously argued that these set new benchmarks of climate action in FTAs
but they may not set new significant norms of practice outside their sub-set.
It took some time, however, for the EU to emerge as some form of climate norm leader
and influencer. Early climate-relevant FTAs it signed had narrow provision type bandwidth
(Table 2) and lacked substance (Table 3). The key turning point was the EU–Korea FTA
(2010), containing nine provision types, over 1400 words of climate-relevant provision
text (i.e., approximately seven times the FTA average up to this point) and was the first to
include provision type 2 (carbon trading and market instruments) and measures on climate
goods trade liberalisation. This FTA was a watershed moment in climate norm development
in trade relations and diplomacy generally and was the outcome of the following inter-
related factors. Around this time, some form of climate action partnership was crystallising
between the EU and Korea. Both had devised strong green growth strategies augmented by
substantial counter-cyclical fiscal responses to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis [109]. The
Korean government under President Lee Myung-bak also had ambitions for the country
to become a ‘green power’ on the wider international stage founded on promoting green
growth norms worldwide and where trade diplomacy was instrumental in achieving
this objective [110,111]. In 2010, the Korean government established the Global Green
Growth Institute (one its four priority areas being clean energy) and also won the bid to
host the UNFCCC’s new Global Climate Fund that provides multilateral financial support
for green growth projects in developing countries. Korea also possessed the strongest
economic and technocratic capacities of any trade partner outside Europe that the EU
had negotiated a climate-relevant FTA with by this time [112,113]. The country was thus
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both a willing, capable climate norms partner the EU could work with in developing this
landmark agreement.
The EU’s most significant new advancement on climate norms achieved through the
EU–Korea agreement was the introduction of ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ as
a thematic chapter or section that cognitively framed many climate action measures in
later FTAs [114]. This was of importance in a wider replication and distributional sense
where climate-relevant provisions being adopted or emulated by third-country parties,
and thus the EU’s climate norm leadership and influence was attaining a broader and
deeper level of acceptance. Table 3 shows that in addition to the EU, which deployed
this approach to subsequent agreements (the only exception being with Canada), another
15 trade partners had applied the ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ thematic norm in
their own FTAs. All subsequent European Free Trade Association (EFTA) group agreements
under study after 2011 adopted a ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ theme, albeit its
constituent climate-relevant provisions being rather narrow focused. The same applies to
Korea’s agreements with Turkey (2012) and Columbia (2013). Its FTAs with Australia (2014)
and New Zealand (2015) did not, though, include this thematic norm. These were two
experienced and technocratically strong FTA negotiating countries, whose closely aligned
interests on agriculture prevailed to set the norm context on climate-relevant provisions in
their agreements with Korea. However, the new FTA norm of support for the ‘international
climate change regime’ introduced in the EU–Korea FTA can too be found in Korea’s
agreements with Australia and New Zealand, as well as all but one of EU agreements
signed afterwards. Furthermore, Korea’s FTAs with these two countries are by far the most
ambitious both had signed of climate relevance by 2020, suggesting Korea exercised some
level of general norm influence over its two fellow Asia-Pacific nations.
What then of the United States? This study’s data clearly show that the US has
remained a minor climate norms actor in FTAs (Table 2, Figures 1 and 2). This is despite
being a very significant environmental norms actor in trade diplomacy more broadly. The
US is party to just six FTAs with climate-relevant provisions, these collectively containing
only nine in total, compared to the EU’s 127. The promotion of climate-relevant goods
and services in the 2018 USMCA—its most recent agreement—is only implicit through its
generic reference to ‘clean technologies’ (Article 24.24) and is moreover uniquely set within
a strong ‘green growth and jobs’ ecological modernisation context. USMCA’s reduction
in GHGs provision (type 6) derives solely from its addressing of ‘emissions from ships’
(Article 24.10e) within the North America region, thus framed more in localised sea and
air pollution terms than global GHG emissions mitigation. The environment chapter of
the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP,
the revised TPP) is heavily based on the US FTA model, and thus the country’s own
domestic legislation [97,115]. Although ironically President Trump withdrew the US from
the CPTPP, there are striking similarities between this agreement and the USMCA. For
example, Article 20.6 of the CPTPP that covers ‘emissions from ships’ is taken more or less
verbatim from USMCA’s Article 24.10. The US has arguably even stronger trade-related
norm leadership and influence capability than the EU. Consistent with its underperforming
climate diplomacy, the US has remained an outlier actor on climate action through FTAs.
Meanwhile Japan—the third-ranked implementer of climate-relevant provisions (27 in
total) after the EU and Korea—has adopted a reflexive and bespoke approach to each
FTA partner, with no evident attempt to regularise particular climate norms in its free
trade agreements.
In sum, the only stand-out climate norms leader and influencer in FTAs—the European
Union—has achieved relatively limited and generalised impact in this regard, and Korea is
the only other notable norm influencer. Any level of climate norm acceptance achieved from
a wide replicated and distributional perspective in the 69 FTAs in study has involved either a
generalised cognitive framing of climate-relevant provisions (e.g., Trade and Sustainable
Development as a thematic norm), or a relatively narrow range of provisions. Where the EU
has achieved substantive climate norm influence in FTAs has been limited to small sub-sets
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of trade partners. Thus, after approximately 40 years of climate action measures in FTAs,
there remains very little evidence of these forming around any trade partner determined
standard norms of trade, energy or other types of policy practice and behaviour. Instead,
only very generalised norms here have arisen approaching a universal level, centred in
climate action co-operation, through a largely organic evolutionary process involving
contributions from multiple trade partners, albeit where the EU has set new benchmarks.
On balance, heterogeneity thus prevails, which at least provides a conducive environment
for policy and norm innovation. To make the most of this opportunity, though, more trade
partners need to commit to introducing more substantive and impactful climate-relevant
measures, as discussed in the previous section.
6. Conclusions
Trade’s importance in shaping today’s global economy and system continues to grow.
As a consequence, trade is an increasingly vital front for tackling climate change. In recent
times, trade policy and relations between countries have become dominated by free trade
agreements (FTAs) that now cover approximately two-thirds of global trade flows. Over the
last decade, the number and substance of climate action measures in FTAs have also grown.
This is indicative of and integral to the changing nature of trade policy, and its deepening
interconnections with energy policy. It was argued in this study that the burgeoning climate
action agenda and the recent expansion of FTAs has provided an opportunity for trade
partners to innovate with new forms of energy trade policy, especially regarding the clean
energy sector. This study has comprehensively examined all climate action measures found
within all FTAs worldwide currently in force and discusses key questions concerning the
importance of these agreements in tackling climate change. These questions form the basis
of three areas of enquiry. The first considers the extent to which climate-relevant provisions
in FTAs are essentially derivative of energy’s connections with trade, and thus part of a
wider trade–climate–energy nexus. This helped establish important inherent features and
the nature of climate action measures found in these agreements. From an examination of
the literature on the subject, six empirical domains of the trade–climate relationship were
established, energy being in some way integral to each of these. These empirical domains
provided an important frame for this study’s analysis and discussion.
The second area of enquiry centred on what different kinds of climate action are
FTAs specifically promoting, and how effective a potential positive impact may we expect
these to have. A template analysis methodological approach was used for this purpose,
drawing upon the six empirical domains to establish 14 different climate-relevant provision
types found in FTA texts. A strong orientation towards the clean energy sector was
evident at this first-tier node-level analysis, and further investigation of the aggregated text
revealed that co-operation and not liberalisation has been the main operational framework
in which climate action measures are incorporated into FTAs. This may be somewhat
contrary to expectations given that FTAs are normally conceived as being intrinsically
about liberalising trade. This climate action co-operation has taken many forms, and this
study’s deeper analysis of the FTA texts revealed its different progressive levels and key
common functional features. Analytical results showed a slow gradual movement toward
more action-structured and programmatic co-operation but with a high degree of dependence
here on EU involvement. The same applied to institutionalised co-operation, although
a wide range of trade partners have engaged in both assistive and multilateral-supportive
functional co-operation. Liberalisation-related climate action in FTAs has arisen in just
a relative handful of agreements and in most instances by rather tenuous link through
tackling non-tariff barriers on environmental goods and services in general.
It was argued that the impact of these largely co-operative measures could be limited
and difficult to assess given that many are somewhat diffuse and open-ended in nature.
In ideal terms, sustained and substantive climate action co-operation fostered through
FTAs can help shape what kind of trade (composition and technique effects) develops in the
longer term, this in turn having a positive climate action outcome—for example, where
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trade partners work collaboratively to strengthen trade capacity in their clean energy
sectors, or on designing carbon trading instruments. Yet provisions with legally binding
commitments to undertake specified climate actions within certain timeframes are likely to
have more defined, quantifiable impacts and lead to more substantial positive results. It
was also argued, though, that the legalisation approach may in certain cases have limited
impact on trade-related climate action, and in others would be more appropriate in other
kinds of international agreement. This study observed that an increasing number of
FTAs contain provisions that support and re-affirm existing legal commitments to reduce
carbon emissions under the UNFCCC climate regime, and that recently negotiated FTAs
by the EU included co-operative measures aimed at facilitating climate action legislation
and regulation. It was contended that on balance, legalisation is a vitally important
future front on which FTAs can have greater climate action impact. Future advances in
legalisation may, however, be easier to achieve in certain trade-climate empirical domains
(e.g., environmental and technical standards, promotion and liberalisation of trade) than
others. For instance, while carbon-related measures involve numerous legalisation-based
policy instruments, carbon tariffs or border carbon adjustments are often viewed as forms
of trade protectionism, and thus problematic to include in free trade agreements.
This study’s third area of enquiry considered whether certain climate action norms
are being promoted by trade partners in FTAs and if so, then who are the norm leaders,
what is motivating them, and to what extent are they extending their influence over other
trade partners. Based on its strong socio-cultural values and policies on climate change,
power capacities, organisational platform and aspirations on global climate diplomacy, the
EU has been the main climate norms leader and influencer in these agreements. This study
found some evidence of significant EU climate norms influence but this was limited to a
few relatively small sub-sets of trade partners, these often regionally defined. Thus, while
the EU has for example managed to leverage the adoption of stronger clean energy policies
in trade partners through these agreements, this has been both very time phase and group
specific, thus with limited replication or distribution effects.
At a more generalised norms leadership and influence level, the EU has introduced
new cognitive framings of climate action measures that have been adopted by a wider
international range of trade partners, the most important being the normative theme of
‘Trade and Sustainable Development’. This norm influence, though, has lacked depth of
impact. On a broader point, the EU has not pushed a boilerplate model of climate norms in
FTAs to be universally applied to all its trade partners and is more reflexive generally than
the US in its negotiating approach. This study also found that Korea is the only other trade
partner to have exercised any real norms influence but this was extremely limited. Thus,
while it is evident that certain climate actions normshave emerged somewhat organically
within FTAs around provision type (where the clean energy sector figures highly) and a
mainly co-operation-based operational framework, not even the EU has proved itself a
significant climate norms leader or influencer. The US meanwhile has remained an outlier.
Heterogeneity thus still more or less prevails with respect to climate action measures in
free trade agreements, which in many respects is conducive to trade–climate–energy policy
innovation. However, this relies on trade partners other than the EU setting new innovative
benchmarks on substantive climate-relevant provisions.
This study has thus shown that there is still much work to carry out on climate action
through FTAs, and more trade partners must innovate and become far more ambitious in
this respect. This study concludes by making three final summative key points. First, (clean)
energy will remain an essential core element of climate action measures in FTAs, providing
important opportunities to develop new forms of energy trade policy in the future. Second,
a more expansive legalisation of these measures will empower the potential impact of
FTAs on climate action generally, but caveats exist and, as discussed, certain legalisation
measures may be incompatible with the aims and scope of a free trade agreement. Third
and lastly, despite a marked intensification of climate action measures in FTAs over the
last decade, as well as significant new policy innovation during this time, international
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norms of practice on this important and still emerging frontier of the trade–climate–energy
nexus remain relatively weak and patchy. With this point in mind, global governance
institutions such as the WTO and the UNFCCC need to become more proactively involved
in managing the deepening links between the global trade system and climate change, to
both strengthen and better co-ordinate worldwide efforts on this vitally important area.
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